

Messages from the ‘Older Brother’: *Djawa Baroe* Magazine and the Japanese Propaganda in Indonesia in 1943-1945

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Abstract

The Japanese occupation of East Asia during World War II was accompanied by its propaganda targeting the local population. In Indonesia, the military government, among other things, published *Djawa Baroe*, a fortnightly magazine published from January 1, 1943, to August 1, 1945. Compared to other magazines, this bilingual magazine (in Japanese and Bahasa Indonesia) *Djawa Baroe* was unique: it featured ample photographs and illustrations. Qualitative content analysis method enables this study to find the meaning of a theme in its holistic political, social, and cultural contexts beyond the number of its occurrences in the text offered by quantitative content analysis. All the issues of *Djawa Baroe* are examined in detail and reiteratively. Six themes can be found in *Djawa Baroe*, i.e., the friendship between Japanese and Indonesians, the description of Japanese military prowess, the exaltation of nationalism, and the preparation for the war, the evil nature of Western power, the role of women in society, and entertainment. The study concludes that along with the development of the Pacific War that turned against the Japanese, *Djawa Baroe* moved its emphasis on long-range goals at the high psychological level to influence and win the hearts and minds of Indonesian people, to a more immediate result and practical guide in facing the imminent war. On the other hand, against the original intention of the Japanese propaganda, *Djawa Baroe* may have helped its educated readers to imagine their future nation-state, Indonesia.

Keywords: *Djawa Baroe*; wartime propaganda; propaganda magazine; Japanese occupation; nation-building

Introduction

The Japanese occupation of Indonesia in 1942-1945, in many ways, is different from the Dutch occupation. One of the most visible differences is in the use of various media by the Japanese military government for propaganda purposes. Newspapers, pamphlets, books, posters, broadcasting, photographs, traditional art performances, etc. were used by Japanese propaganda institutions. The purposes were, of course, to win the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people, so that they would support the Japanese in its efforts to win the war. For example, the Japanese called themselves as *saudara tua*

(older brother) of the Indonesian people, replacing the use of the word *tuan* (master) to call the Dutch.

In general, the Japanese imperial propaganda in East Asia tried to form an image of Japan as the leader of modern Asia. In doing so, the propaganda is intended to win what they called the *shisosen* ("thought war") against Western power (Kushner, 2006). In launching its propaganda, including the one aimed to Indonesian populace, the Japanese had used various media available at the time, such as newspapers, pamphlets, books, posters, photographs, broadcasting, exhibitions, speech, drama, traditional arts performances, paper picture shows, music, and films (Kurasawa, 2015).

Yoesoef (2010) shows how important playwright figures such as Usmar Ismail and Armijn Pane enthusiastically embraced the opportunity by writing the scripts which were then performed by theater groups at that time.

The Japanese emphasized the use of audiovisual media (radio and films), which was more effective for rural people, making them more aware of the outside world and connected to the larger society. Other than messages to encourage support for the Japanese occupation agenda, it also brought Japanese then-contemporary popular culture (Kurnia, 2018). Since the content of many audiovisual media produced by the propaganda agencies were also speeches by the national figures, it was through this medium that the general population could see their leaders (Kurasawa, 2015). In other words, the propaganda helped to create the population as, borrowing Anderson's (1993/1998) famous phrase, an "imagined communities." Accordingly, after analyzing some of the Japanese film propaganda in Indonesia, Nieuwenhof (1984: 171) stated that although anti-Western imperialism was the central theme of the propaganda, "...but at the same time the condition laid down for Indonesian national independence".

For the literate and educated people in the occupied region, the Japanese propaganda bodies published print media. In Vietnam and Malaya, for example, they published *Tân Á (New Asia)* (Siraishi, 2019) and *Fajar Asia* (Manickam, 2017), respectively. In April 1942, the Indonesian-language daily *Asia Raja* was launched to promote Japanese-Indonesian cooperation and mutual understanding. It eventually became an influential newspaper and the "model and flagship newspaper for the duration of the Japanese occupation" (Mark, 2010: 357). However, Mahayana's (2013) study points out some cases that, on literature and cultural contents, in *Asia Raja* were not in line with the Japanese propaganda agenda. Meanwhile, the Japanese occupation government also assigned *Pandji Poestaka*, the magazine published by the official literary body Balai Pustaka, as its propaganda vehicle. Pradana & Haidar (2015) summarize the emphasis of the Japanese propaganda through *Pandji Poestaka* into several consecutive periods: trust-building (1942-1943), food for war (1944), and homeland defense (1945).

This article discusses Japanese propaganda in the fortnightly magazine called *Djawa Baroe* (New Java). *Djawa Baroe*, published in Java from January 1, 1943, to August 1, 1945, right before the Japanese surrender. It is a 30-page magazine, with approximately half of the pages are full of photos. *Djawa Baroe* covered not only political and war developments but also various aspects of daily life

in Java in the time of occupation. This is the most important characteristic of *Djawa Baroe* since there was no other publication in Java during the Japanese occupation, in which predominantly pictures appeared. Indeed, *Djawa Baroe* was one among very few photogravure magazines published by the Japanese in all the occupied areas in World War II (Kurasawa, 1992). The target audience was clearly the literate and educated people, who, although small in number, can be considered as the opinion leaders among the mass illiterate in Indonesia.

Kurniasih (2017) has conducted a quantitative content analysis on *Djawa Baroe*, which basically counts the frequency of news topic categories, propaganda types (white, black, or gray propaganda) and propaganda techniques (plain folk, name-calling, etc.). However, the discussion of the broader context of the Japanese propaganda, let alone the Japanese occupation in general and its consequence to Indonesian society, is conspicuously absent in that analysis. This article provides more nuanced meaning and socio-political-cultural context of *Djawa Baroe* and, therefore, the complexity of the interaction of the literate and educated Indonesians with the Japanese authority during the occupation.

Theoretical Framework

Japanese Occupation in Indonesia

The Japanese government started the preparation to conquest East Asia soon after World War II broke in Europe. In the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese troops did not find substantial resistance to the Dutch power, and in a matter of days the Dutch rule came to an end with the surrender on March 9, 1942 (Benda, 1966; Sato, 1994). The key promise of the Japanese for the occupied people was the liberation from the long time oppression of Western power, and then the inclusion in the Pan-Asia Japanese-led project 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.' This project is part of transnational optimism "Asianism" in which Asia would offer the middle way between "...Western'-style scientific rationality, meritocracy, industrialization, and socioeconomic planning to the imagined, time-honored 'Eastern' of community, morality, and spirituality" (Mark, 2006: 462).

However, in terms of war strategy, the Japanese invasion to Indonesia was intended to secure the supply of strategic raw materials (such as oil, rubber, tin, and other metals) needed to support the empire. Unfortunately, in 1943 the Japanese started suffering losses on the sea, making "... [the] cultivation crops, such as rubber, coffee, tea, and quinine, which had been directly

connected with the world market, were cut off from their traditional export markets" (van Zanden & Marks, 2012: 134).

According to Kurasawa (2015), the primary characteristic of the Japanese policy was the combination of control and mobilization of the people. The natural and economic resources, workforce, as well as political leaders, were mobilized and forced to fully support the government to reach the final victory. In Sato's (1994) words, the Japanese military government tried to create a "total war structure" in the occupied territories. On the other hand, the mobilization efforts were always accompanied by strict controls on society. The Japanese occupation government controlled, for example, the lifestyle and behaviors of the people, daily life activities, education, media, etc. (Kurasawa, 2015).

The mobilization and control were carried out by, among other things, establishing "the all-embracing vertical and horizontal networks of the administrative system" (Sato, 1994: 20) that enabled the government to control as far as the household level and the creation of many mass organizations. At the local, village, and community levels, *keibodan* (vigilance corps) and *seinendan* (youth corps), *tonarigumi* (neighborhood association) were formed. Meanwhile, at the nation-wide level, organizations such as Putera (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat*, or Concentration of the People's Energy) and *Jawa Hokokai* (*Himpunan Kebaktian Rakyat* or Java Public Service Association) were established. The control was also done through Kempetai, the military police, which was notoriously brutal and ruthless (Aziz, 1969).

Nevertheless, there is another side of Japanese occupation for Indonesian society (Kurasawa, 1992; Mark, 2010; Reid, 1980; Sato, 1994). Reid (1980: 18) asserts that "... it is not inappropriate to regard 1942 as the beginning of the whole revolutionary upheaval which gave birth to modern Indonesia". Sato (1994: vii) supports this notion by mentioning some political changes under the Japanese,

...the Indonesian nationalists consolidated their political leadership; the Japanese promised to grant independence to Indonesia, and its preparation was almost completed by the end of the occupation; the indigenous defense forces were created; the consolidation of Islamic groups progressed to a significant extent, and groups of politicized youths emerged.

For Mark (2010: 363), the legacy even goes further into contemporary Indonesia and

particularly apparent "in continued elite appeals for harmonious modern development empowered by a return to imagined indigenous, non-Western national racial and cultural traditions—long after the appeal of Japan as the model had faded from the equation".

In particular, Kurasawa (1992) highlights three occupation government policies that contributed to the building up of the newly independent Indonesia, which was self-proclaimed on August 17, 1945. Firstly, military training to Indonesian youth was very crucial in defending the independence against the Dutch, who returned as part of the Allied forces and wanted to reclaim authority over Indonesia. Secondly, by filling positions in the governmental and semi-governmental institutions left by the Dutch with Indonesians, the occupation government gave practical training for higher positions in administration (see also Thee, 2013). Thirdly, the Japanese military government adopted the Indonesian language as the official language, so that its position was strengthened and was widely disseminated and eventually became the national language.

Propaganda and Media During the Occupation

The population of territories covered by the Japanese occupation in World War II is very diverse, and consequently, its propaganda cannot be monolingual and monolithic. Furthermore, the political and military constellation in Japan made it difficult to have one single organ for propaganda. In Kushner's words (2006: 6), "... no single authority reigned over the entire propaganda apparatus the way Hitler and Goebbels ruled at the top of the Nazi propaganda pyramid." Consequently, there are unavoidable competitions between different agencies with varying messages for the same audience. Nevertheless, the core agenda remains the same, i. e. Japan is the modern leader of Asia and is the liberator of Asia from the plight of western colonialism (Kushner, 2006).

The belief that Japan will guide Asia is not only held by politicians or military people, but also by the people from different levels of society in Japan. Many of them from various backgrounds joined with one of the propaganda agencies and were embedded in the occupation authorities (Mark, 2014; Kushner, 2006). Writers, artists, photographers, filmmakers, advertisers, musicians, dramatists, etc. played a crucial role, because "... in an age of mass media and mass mobilization, their propaganda skills had become indispensable" (Mark, 2014: 1184). In other words, the Japanese propaganda deploys diverse medium of propaganda such as films, newspapers, magazines,

and other auditory-visual media (drama, traditional art performances, music, etc.).

Japanese propaganda in Indonesia began even before the invasion. Ruslan Abdulgani (quoted by Benda, 1956: 545) noted that “On December 8, 1941. From that day onwards, a nightly Indonesian news commentary was broadcast by Radio Tokyo. Each transmission was concluded with the national anthem, *Indonesia Raya*.” The use of the Indonesian national anthem and flag in pre-invasion propaganda was intended to gain local support in ousting the Western power and present herself to Asia as the savior of the Orient from ruthless exploitation of the West. As Lomas (1949: 31) points out, “[Japan] must appear to support local independence movements, while at the same time offering economic advantages for full-scale co-operation with Japan”.

The Japanese military government continued to launch its propaganda even more extensively and intensively during the occupation. This time, the Indonesian flag, the Red and White, and the national anthem *Indonesia Raya* were forbidden. Instead, the Japanese flag Hinomaru and *Kimigayo* was considered to be the national flag and the national anthem, respectively, of the Indonesian people (Kurasawa, 1992). Kurasawa (2015) has examined the practice of the Japanese propaganda in Java extensively during the occupation, especially the use of audio-visual media. The propaganda purposes were to mobilize Indonesian people to be prepared for the war and, at the same time, internally promoted the Greater East Asian Co-Prospersity Sphere.

In order to coordinate the propaganda efforts to Indonesian civilians, the occupation government set up a department called Sendenbu in August 1942. Meanwhile, military propaganda directed towards Japanese soldiers and prisoners of war, and also towards civilians in countries opposed to Japan was still carried out by the Information Section of the Army. In April 1945, however, these two propaganda bodies were merged into one office, which launched both civil and military propaganda. Although its activities were directed to the civilians, Sendenbu was always headed by military officers (Kurasawa, 2015).

According to Kurasawa (2015), despite the use of various media, Japanese propaganda emphasized audio-visual media, especially movies, performing arts, paper picture shows, and music. Print media were also used, but these media were circulated mainly among the educated and urban people. The strategy to emphasize the use of audio-visual media is understandable since it would reach the uneducated and rural audience, who constituted the majority of the Indonesian people, more

effectively. Among the audio-visual propaganda media, movies were particularly important and had the most significant impact on the masses. The movies presented to the public were even produced in Java, in addition to the ones produced in Japan (Kurasawa, 2015).

The Japanese propagandists seemed to be aware of the use of language in their effort. Dutch had been banned because it was the enemy language; it was also not widely spoken in the rural area. The military government intended to promote Japanese as the lingua franca of East Asian people; nevertheless, the language was still far from being a medium of communication, even among the educated and urban people. Therefore, the use of Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) was unavoidable for the Japanese propagandists, although they found soon that the language was also not widely spoken by people in rural areas. Most of the propaganda materials, then, should be re-translated into local languages, and the content of the movies and speech in Indonesian, for example, was summarized by local propagandists. Meanwhile, most of the printed media used Bahasa Indonesia since they are intended to the audience who spoke that language (Kurasawa, 2015).

The main themes of the propaganda reflected the internal as well as external challenges faced by the military government at each specific time (Kurasawa, 2015). During the first period (1942-1943), the main themes were naturally ideologically oriented. From the Japanese point of view, people needed to be informed about why they waged war by also emphasizing the evil of the West. The target of the propaganda activity at that stage was to discard the anti-Japanese feelings among the people and persuade them to join in the defining of the new era under Japanese leadership. With some variations, this central theme was prevalent in the propaganda throughout the occupation period.

In the second period (1944-1945), in addition to the ideological theme, Japanese propaganda emphasized more practical and materialistic themes, which can be divided into two major categories: economy and defense. There were several reasons for such themes (Kurasawa, 2015): the war became more adverse to the Japanese; economic exploitation became a more urgent need for the military government; and the possibility of the Allied attack on Java. The promotion of “saving and sparing” was added in 1944, and the issue of enemy’s spies (*Awat Mata-Mata Moesoeh* or Be Careful of Enemy Spies) was added in 1945. However, the propaganda message was telling the people that it was in their own

interest to strive for safety and prosperity, and not for the benefit of Japan.

Concerning print media, the Japanese quickly banned all newspapers and magazines in two weeks after it seized power in Indonesia (Kurasawa, 1992). The military government then ordered that all newspaper companies had to be merged into one, and published newspapers under new names: *Asia Raja* (see Mahayana, 2013) and *Pandji Poestaka* (see Pradana & Haidar, 2015) in Jakarta, *Tjahaja* in Bandung, *Sinar Matahari* in Yogyakarta, and *Soeara Asia* in Surabaya. The Japanese also did not allow newspaper publication in any other cities (Kurasawa, 1992: 24). Censorship was applied strictly, and Japanese military officials were attached to the newspaper operation. All the newspapers' content—news, editorial, advertisement text, etc.—had to be sent to the censorship office (*Gun Kenetsu-han*) to get the approval. The censor was very strict so that when Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, for example, the newspapers were forbidden to publish this news. Although a Japanese military official headed the censor office, the news, editorials, etc. were actually read by Indonesians who were working there.

Materials and Methodology

In 1992, all editions of *Djawa Baroe* magazines were reprinted in limited numbers and were bound into five volumes. This research is based on one of these reprinted editions in the collection of Alden Library, Ohio University, USA.

The qualitative content analysis method is used to analyze *Djawa Baroe*. Both quantitative and qualitative content analysis share similar basic procedures, namely making the coding frame, creating category definitions, analyzing the materials into the category, and presenting the analysis (Schreier, 2014). However, while quantitative content analysis relies on the frequency or occurrences of given themes to show the importance of such themes, the qualitative content analysis provides more space for a detailed interpretive analysis of the researched materials. In other words, the qualitative content analysis enables researchers to show that, in many cases, the importance of a theme or category is not defined by the number of its occurrences but by its meaning in the holistic political, social and cultural contexts. Therefore, qualitative content analysis acknowledges “the central role of the investigator in a research process that is designed to support reflexivity and interaction” (Williamson, Given & Scifleet, 2018: 463).

Results and Discussion

Djawa Baroe and the Propaganda

Djawa Baroe was published by *Jawa Shinbun*, the official publication institution of the military government. *Djawa Baroe*, literally means the New Java, indicating the spirit of that time when Javanese people were eager to see a new society emerging out of the Dutch colonization. It is interesting to note here that the names of most of such publications bore optimism to the future of the society. Other examples were *Tân Á (New Asia)* published in Vietnam (Siraishi, 2019) and *Fadjar Asia* published in Malaya (Manickam, 2017).

Compared to the magazines that were published during the Japanese occupation, *Djawa Baroe* was unique. It was bilingual, whereas all other magazines were either in Indonesian or Japanese (Kurasawa 1990). Furthermore, most of those magazines targeted more specific audiences, for example *Soeara MIAI* was intended for the Muslim community; *Pradjoerit* was for soldiers of the Java Volunteer Army (*Pembela Tanah Air*, PETA); *Panji Poestaka* (in Indonesian) and *Shin Jawa* (in Japanese) were intended for intellectual readers and consisted of more academic articles. By reporting news and illustrating it with ample photographs, *Djawa Baroe* was designed to target a broader audience, both Indonesian and Japanese, in Java. *Djawa Baroe* was co-published by *Djawa Shinbun*, a Japanese newspaper staffed by editors from *Asahi Shinbun*, the biggest newspaper company in Japan. When *Djawa Shinbun* was set up, Indonesian owned newspaper *Asia Raja* was absorbed into this company (Kurasawa, 1992).

The first edition of *Djawa Baroe* (January 1, 1943) set the tone for the following editions. The cover depicted two Japanese children and two Indonesian children—all of them in their traditional clothes—playing a ball together. The caption, written in two languages, says “Japanese kids and Indonesian kids are gleefully playing together.” On the first page, the editor explained to the reader the purpose of *Djawa Baroe*. The text was superimposed on a very metaphorical picture: a row of Japanese soldiers under a coconut tree, in the tranquility of the Gulf of Banten when the sun was rising and reflected on the seawater, facing north to pay respect to the Emperor's palace.

The text says *Djawa Baroe*'s aspirations, which are: (1) *Djawa Baroe* magazine will give accurate information about Japan, the Co-Prosperity Sphere, with Java as its center, and also other parts of the world. The pictures are the authentic proofs since they depict the reality and cannot lie; (2) *Djawa Baroe* is the best bridge between Indonesian and Japanese people. This magazine is the meeting point of the two nations;

(3) *Djawa Baroe* also can be used as a tool to attain victory in this fierce war. This magazine will augment the brotherly feelings between the Japanese and Indonesian; (4) *Djawa Baroe* was managed hand in hand by the Japanese and Indonesian staff to realize the strong collaboration between the Indonesians and Japanese, which is between newspaper staff of *Djawa Shinboen* and *Asia Raya*; and (5) *Djawa Baroe* will grow fast, and its content will become more and more perfect. The readers are expected to make this magazine the dependable information resource.

The Friendship between the Japanese and Indonesian Peoples

Depictions of the friendship between the two peoples were notably conspicuous in the first year of *Djawa Baroe*. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese occupation government had to try to win the hearts and minds of the local population, and persuade them to discard anti-Japanese feelings. Interestingly, pictures of children from both nations were frequently used to depict this friendship. The cover of the first edition, as mentioned earlier, is an excellent example of the use of children's pictures. Furthermore, pictures of Indonesian children also were used to depict how they had been very sympathetic to the occupation itself. In the cover of the February 1, 1943 edition, six Indonesian children, dressed very neatly, saluted the passing-by marching Japanese soldiers. Elsewhere, in the edition of March 1, 1943, some kindergarten students stood firmly and solemnly while two of their friends, a boy and a girl, were hoisting the Hinomaru on the flag pole. Closing the year, on December 15, 1943 edition, *Djawa Baru* featured on the cover a toddler, dressed in a perfect Japanese soldier uniform and holding a wooden rifle with a wooden bayonet attached, and saluting his mother. She was smiling gleefully and squatting in front of him. The sign of the militaristic nature of Japanese occupation is very apparent in this picture.

Pictures of women of both nations also were frequently featured. Indonesian women dressed in kimonos were published, and "the appearance of Indonesian girls in Japanese dress are beautiful and look alike Japanese girls" (June 1, 1943: 18-19). In the January 1, 1944 edition, *Djawa Baroe*'s cover depicted the wife of the leader who became the first president in the independence Indonesia, Soekarno, smiling happily dressed in a kimono.

The friendship was also presented in the magazine by showing that Indonesian people supported the Japanese occupation government. In the first edition, there are pictures of a mass meeting in Jakarta to celebrate the first anniversary

of the East Asia Great War, which was said to have been attended by some thirty thousand people. Small Hinomaru flags were waved by thousands of people, creating theatrical pictures and the impression that the Indonesians were very welcoming of the Japanese. The villagers were also presented as supportive of the Japanese government. In an almost painting-like picture, some fifty villagers, facing away from the camera, some holding a small Hinomaru, were gathering to celebrate the New Year (January 15, 1944: 3). On the background was the terraced paddy field, hills, and, of course, the rising sun.

Indeed, many days were celebrated in the Japanese occupation era. That way, there were reasons to gather people in mass meetings and to have people marching on the city as well as village streets. The day the Dutch surrendered on March 9 was celebrated, and the cities and villages were bustling with the celebration. *Djawa Baroe* edition of March 15, 1943, was dominated with the magnificent pictures of the celebration.

"The joy of fifty million Javanese people created waves of the Rising Sun flags, from Djakarta to the remote villages. The waves of flags inundated the Island of Java. All the people felt in their hearts the energy of the rising nation, intending to develop the new society, along with the belief that 'the victory surely will come.' They expressed their joy in their heart by enthusiastically waving the flags of 'the older brother country—Japan'".

Japanese Military Operations and the Strength of the Military Forces

As a part of the Japanese military government propaganda machinery, *Djawa Baroe* naturally informed its readers of the might and victories of the Japanese army—a very prevalent theme of *Djawa Baroe* throughout its publication, and even more prevalent in the later period when the Japanese were more on the defensive. At the same time, as in any war propaganda from any other country, it downgraded and concealed the enemy's forces and its progress in the war. In its first edition (January 1, 1943), for example, *Djawa Baroe* presented a two-page map showing how vast the Japanese battlefield was. It stretched as far as the Aleut Islands of the Northern Pacific, Hawaii, the Solomon Islands on the South Pacific, Australia, Indonesian Archipelago, Malay Peninsula, Burma, and China. The caption says, "This vast area of the battlefield is unparalleled." On the left sidebar, it listed what the Japanese army and navy had achieved in defeating its enemies in the previous year, in terms of the

number of enemies' casualties, prisoner of wars, enemies' warfare confiscated, etc. No single word, unsurprisingly, on similar information on the Japanese side. This kind of report was usual in the earlier editions of *Djawa Baroe* and was gradually absent in the latter editions when the war was nearing to its decisive end.

The use of a full-page or two-page pictures to depict the might of the armed forces was in most of *Djawa Baroe* issues. On February 1, 1943 issue, for example, a full-page picture showed Japanese bombers in a formation, and the caption said, "Young Garuda Nippon in arrays are heading to the bombing." The use of the word "Garuda" was a smart one since it was a mythical bird with supernatural powers from the stories of Ramayana. Garuda had been known especially by the Javanese people for a long time through the very popular shadow puppet traditional arts and had become a subconscious archetype in the Javanese culture. In fact, Garuda then becomes the national symbol of Indonesia. By using the word Garuda, not only did this picture represent the "supernatural" vigor of the Japanese bombers, but it also evoked the very inner psychology of the Indonesian people.

Later, Garuda was very frequently used to describe the Japanese air force and its kamikaze airplane pilots. For example, it was used on March 1, 1943 edition in a picture portraying a Japanese kamikaze airplane that hit and sank a U.S. ship carrier in the sea war near the Solomon Islands. It was also used in the last edition of *Djawa Baroe*, August 1, 1945, when it presented the kamikaze squads as its cover story. There were three kamikaze airplane pilots on the magazine cover—smiling, calm and relaxed, and one of them helping to light the other's cigarette. Inside the magazine, there was a seven pages photo essay on the kamikaze, pilot training, and the preparation of the attacks. The second and third page of the photo essay was titled, "Attack now, godly-Garuda" Furthermore, one of the captions said, "Go! The godly-Garudas are happily parting with their compatriots and saying, 'Let me go first!'"

The Exaltation of Patriotism, Devotion to the Nation, and Preparation of War

Besides the tight control on the society, mobilization is another crucial characteristic of the Japanese military government in Indonesia (Kurasawa, 2015) to create a "total war structure" that emphasized the "defense and construction"

(Sato 1994). The mobilization was intensified after the Japanese defeat in the Aleut Islands in May 1943 by the American forces. This was the turning point of the Japanese war strategy from offense to defense. According to Sato (1994: 60), "Tokyo recognized the urgent need to start massive defense buildups in the occupied areas and to secure strong cooperation from the local population." Therefore, ordinary people were trained to face the war, as depicted in the cover of November 11, 1944, where some Indonesian women in traditional dress are practicing the Japanese martial arts Naginata. In the same issue, *Djawa Baroe* published serial pictures which were taken from the mass meetings held several days before. In the meeting, the paper puppets of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Van der Plas were burnt by the masses. Neighborhood vigilances were intensified, and first aid and emergency rescue training were escalated. The people were trained to be prepared for an air raid: how to save their own life, extinguish a fire, heal the wounds, and evacuate the casualties (e. g. *Djawa Baroe* August 1, 1943; August 1, 1944; August 15, 1944; November 1, 1944).

In order to strengthen its military power, the Japanese military government also hired Indonesian auxiliary soldiers (*heiho*). *Djawa Baroe* (August 1, 1943), for example, published two pages of pictures of the *heiho* soldiers training. "Indonesian heroes have understood the Japanese soldiers' spirit," the caption said. In October 1943, the Japanese created Peta (*Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air*, or Voluntary Defence Forces) to mobilize Javanese people further, and the October 15, 1943 edition of *Djawa Baroe*, was intended to be the special edition for Peta. It published the decree of Peta creation, as well as the transcription of radio speech on this matter delivered by high-ranking Japanese military officials. Naturally, it published the recruitment of Peta soldiers' pictures, with the caption said, "Java must be defended by our own hands." The coverage continued in the following several editions of *Djawa Baroe*, such as on November 15, 1943, when one full page picture showed Peta soldiers marching: "The brave Peta soldiers have a big duty: defending the homeland."

The mobilization also touched civilians, by ordering them to participate in war training, many of them led by the Peta soldiers. *Djawa Baroe*, March 15, 1945, published two pages of photographs depicting Indonesians in the youth corps practicing their skills in using bamboo spears. It said that a new fighting technique using bamboo spears had been created by combining Indonesian and Japanese traditional martial arts.

Four pages of *Djawa Baroe*, May 15, 1945, depicted the war training by civilians, which was led by Peta soldiers.

“The purpose of the war training to defend the homeland is that every Javanese people can be a soldier so that they can crush the wicked and sinful enemies if they land here on our homeland. If we are not determined to sacrifice, to defend the homeland with our own blood and with the trust with each other, then it will be impossible for us to defend our homeland from the foreigner threats so that we are not able to attain glorious independent Indonesia”.

Some industries related to war supplies were also mobilized, and associated with the duty to defend the nation. Tire manufacturing, for example, was put in the context of war. On two pages of its March 1, 1943 edition, *Djawa Baroe* printed some photographs of activities in a tire factory and wrote:

“This factory was initially set up using American capital to produce tires that were used to oppress and run over Asia. After being managed by the Japanese, the workers in the factory—be they are Indonesians, Chinese, or Indo-Dutch—have vowed to support Japan and produced tires for the development of the [East Asia] co-prosperity”.

Meanwhile, in two pages with six photographs of its June 15, 1945 edition, *Djawa Baroe* reported the same thing on a wooden-ship building factory:

“The energy from the hand of Indonesian craftsmen, intended to destroy the enemies, has taken in the form of wooden-ships. Their blood and spirit have instilled each and every nail and the wooden board. As if they have witnessed their own son growing up, the craftsmen are determined to build wooden ships as many as they can in the future”.

War propaganda also promoted self-sufficiency and production to increase. “To crush America and Britain, everybody in Java—old and young people, women, and children—energetically works to increase agricultural products,” wrote *Djawa Baroe*, March 1, 1945.

The pictures depicted a smiling women farmer harvesting corns, several people working in terraced paddy fields, and children plowing paddy field with a child drumming a drum major on the foreground.

The Japanese also, for example, introduced new techniques in paddy planting so that Indonesian farmers would have a better yield. This mobilization was done in such a way that competitions of paddy field plowing were held in many places. Amusingly, *Djawa Baroe* in its June 15, 1945 edition published a two-page report on such a competition, with a caption entitled “A Speech from a Water Buffalo Who Was Participating in the Plowing Competition” that went like this:

“Indonesian people are working hard in military training, production increase efforts, as well as in the efforts to be self-sufficient in clothing, so that glorious independent Indonesia can be attained sooner by achieving the final victory in this Greater East Asia War. In this time, therefore, it will be sinful for us, the Indonesian water buffalos who have been beholden to Indonesian people since our ascendants, if we do not stand up to help them as much as we can. I have a request, however, to Master Fat, my master, that he must repair his agriculture tools. In my opinion, repairing agriculture tools and making water buffaloes healthy and brawny are the prerequisites for the agriculture sector advancement in Java”.

The Evil of the West and the War Propaganda

Although the propaganda against the West had been launched from the beginning of the occupation, it intensified in the latter period of the occupation. The reason was apparent: The Japanese military government needed to prepare the war since the U.S. forces had won some critical battles and had advanced their positions. The morale of the Japanese in the occupation area should be maintained by pointing to the weakness as well as the immorality of the enemy in one hand and showing the strength of the Japanese army on the other hand.

Djawa Baroe, for example, published an article describing the cruelty of the U.S. soldiers (November 15, 1944), such as daytime attacks on Red-Cross ships and hospitals; putting dead and wounded Japanese soldiers in rows and then running over them with tanks, and making knife handles from the arm or leg bones of dead Japanese soldiers, and then sending those to their

lovers back home. These cruelties were predictable, the article went on, because the U.S. had recruited gangsters to be soldiers. The article was accompanied by a caricature depicting President Roosevelt instructing a criminal who had just taken off his stripped clothes and changed it with the U.S. Army uniform to do the same things that he had done in the past when he was sent to the frontline. On the other hand, there is also caricature that portrayed the U.S. soldiers' cowardice so that many of them pretended to be insane to avoid being sent to the frontline (March 1, 1945).

Another caricature (February 15, 1945) illustrated the poor condition of the U.S. airplane pilots. Coming out from their airplane wreckage, after having just been shot down by the Japanese, the two pilots surrendered. And the caption runs as follows,

“If we see the clothes of the U.S. pilots and crews from the shot down airplanes, ... some of them wore official uniforms, and some others wore civilian clothes. There were some wearing clothes as if it had been divided for two persons. Even some of them had only shoes on them. ... We are forced to assume that the American air force has brought a bunch of vagabonds from the 'back street' of Chicago”.

One more example: *Djawa Baroe* featured a caricature depicting two U.S. police officers chasing three little children who were playing war games using some airplane toys (March 1, 1945). The reason, as the caption said, is this:

“According to the news from Washington, there has been a trend among children in the U.S. to play war games. They would play airplane toys with the symbol of the sun on the body of the airplane [representing the Japanese airplanes] and then strike it to the ship toys [representing the U.S. ships] so that the ships are overturned. Since the U.S. is in a war situation, the government takes that war game seriously. Therefore, that war game is now forbidden, and the anti-Axis countries in South America are asked to arrest the creator of that war game”.

Naturally, *Djawa Baroe* also published articles and pictures to portray the economic deterioration of the Allied forces. “America and

British Are Puzzled: The Trembling President Because of the General Strike,” *Djawa Baroe* wrote in its May 1, 1943 edition. Accompanied by some photographs and a caricature depicting President Roosevelt lied to the American people, the article informed the reader about the plunge of the dollar in the international money market, the shortage of food in the U.S., and the decline of British economy so that it became a nation with a huge debt.

The Roles of Women

One of the striking features of *Djawa Baroe* is that it had many pictures of women in various activities. Indeed, as many as twenty-six out of all sixty-two issues of *Djawa Baroe* cover portrayed women, such as Soekarno's wife smiling wearing a kimono (January 1, 1944), two medical students (June 1, 1943), two women harvesting watermelon planted in Java (July 1, 1943), a female Javanese traditional dancer pointing her arrow with a Hinomaru flag pinned on her waist (and the dance was called ‘Crushing America and British Dance,’ December 1, 1943), a woman wearing an outfit specially designed for the striking defense (July 15, 1944), the students from a women's teacher school practicing the Japanese martial art Naginata using bamboo spears (November 15, 1944), and a woman picking fruits of castor oil plant (the plant promoted by the Japanese to be planted in yards of houses and unused land to provide fuel for its aircraft) (May 1, 1945), etc. Inside the magazine, the pictures of women in various activities are easily found.

As Lucas (1997) notes, the Japanese seemed to be trying to extend the role of Indonesian women in the times of war, while at the same time upholding the traditional roles such as wife, mother, and agricultural labor. They certainly hoped that Indonesian women assumed the same roles to that of Japanese women in Japan who were obligated to join the nation-wide women organization, *Fujinkai*. However, “As the war situation turned against Japan, [women] assumed more and more militaristic features. In June 1945, women's combat forces armed with bamboo spears were created nation-wide in preparation for the feared landing of Allied forces. (Sato, 1994: 20). *Djawa Baroe* noticeably reflected these expected roles in its many pages throughout its publication.

Initially, the representation of women in *Djawa Baroe* was less militaristic, although they still conveyed a degree of war propaganda. Even in its several issues, *Djawa Baroe* introduced its readers to Japanese female movie stars. Featuring three female actresses in its second issue (January

15, 1943), *Djawa Baroe* wrote, "Celebrating the New Year, all [Japanese] women work and are determined to continue the victory in this second year of the Greater East Asia War." In the same issue, however, two pages of *Djawa Baroe* (14-15) entitled "Indonesian women are gorgeous," featuring four pictures of women from different parts of Indonesia. They were likened to sweet-smelling fragrant flowers: "Javanese women are pure and clear like jasmine, Minangkabau women are red dahlias, and Minahasan women are fragrantly like white roses." Indonesian women were also portrayed in learning and performing works in the home, as well as working to support the war.

In later issues, as the expected role of women changed along with the war situation, Indonesian women were portrayed differently to be more militaristic, although traditional roles were also still depicted. February 15, 1944 issue, for example, showed Indonesian women in military-like training. They stood and marched in rows like real soldiers, climbing up and down hills, carrying wooden rifles on their shoulders, with the caption said: "We also want to fulfill our duty to defend the homeland." In contrast, the next two pages of the issue showed women working in a lemonade production plant. Meanwhile, the students of the Women School 'Shiraguki,' were showed performing 'The Fortress Struggle Java Dance' while holding small Hinomaru flags (September 1, 1944).

The Propatainment

Kurasawa (2015) has shown that the occupation government highly promoted the use of audiovisual media in propaganda. Therefore, entertainment media such as movies, performing arts, music, and paper picture shows (*kamishibai*) were heavily used, something that might be appropriately called "propatainment" (propaganda-entertainment). While *Djawa Baroe* was not under the category of audiovisual media, it also supported the propatainment by publishing articles or pictures on those audiovisual propatainment activities. Film reviews, for example, were published in several issues of *Djawa Baroe*.

Nevertheless, *Djawa Baroe* also had its propatainment fitting with its nature as a print medium, especially in the form of serial stories, short stories, play scripts, and cartoons. In the first seven issues, Andjar Asmara wrote a serial story called *Setinggi-tinggi Terbang Bangau* in which he told the story about a Westernized Indonesian man who married a Dutch woman. Naturally, the men eventually realized that his lifestyle was not patriotic and returned to be true Indonesian. In

later issues, the stories in *Djawa Baroe*, of course, accorded with the current occupation policies. In two issues, December 1 and 15, 1943, for example, *Djawa Baroe* published serial stories written by Usmar Ismail, later known as one of the Indonesian first generations of movie directors and considered as "the Father of Indonesian Movies," entitled "The Homeland's Call: *Tjitra*" (*Panggilan Tanah Air: Tjitra*). In this story, Usmar Ismail told his reader of the enthusiasm of the people from all walks of life to join the voluntary forces Peta, including the youth from well off families.

While serial stories and short stories were loaded with propaganda messages, most of the cartoons were purely entertaining. Nevertheless, some of them were infused with some propaganda. One cartoon published on May 15, 1943, for instance, depicted the launching ceremony of apparently a new American warship. As usual, a bottle of wine was thrown to the body of the ship before it was launched into the sea. The bottle was broken, as it was supposed to be, but it also created a big hole on the body of the ship—indicating how vulnerable and helpless the new American warship was.

Conclusion

Indeed, *Djawa Baroe* is propaganda media *par excellence*. From cover to cover in each issue, it was used to convey messages of the Japanese military government, as shown by some examples discussed above. Intertwining and emphasizing three types out of ten types of propaganda analysis—namely "the ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign, the context in which the propaganda occurs, and media utilization techniques—proposed by Jowett and O'Donnell (1999: 280), this paper reveals how *Djawa Baroe* served its function as propaganda media. Also, using Gilmore's (1998) framework, since its publication for the first time in January 1943, *Djawa Baroe* seemed to be moving from the strategic propaganda to the tactical propaganda along with the development of the Pacific War that turned against the Japanese. In other words, *Djawa Baroe* moved from an emphasis on long-range goals at the high psychological level to influence, mobilize and win the hearts and minds of Indonesian people, to a more immediate result and practical guide in facing the imminent war.

Concerning whether *Djawa Baroe* succeeded or failed in its effort to win the Indonesian people, there is no direct evidence about it. However, in audiovisual propaganda media, Kurasawa (2015) argues that the Japanese propaganda may have been more effective among

the rural and uneducated mass of the population, and its most substantial main impact may have among the younger generation, both urban and rural. Furthermore, she argues that the most notable effect of Japanese propaganda media was the increase in the volume of information Indonesian society received. She asserts that the audiovisual media expanded the horizon of the people as a part of a larger society. It is through the screens that the people saw the faces of their national leaders for the first time. In this sense, *Djawa Baroe* served the same purpose by introducing the future Indonesian leaders on its front covers. The September 1944 issue is a very telling example: it showed the picture of the future first president Soekarno standing in front of a group of people. Photographed from the top angles, all are in white clothes, facing the camera, smiling happily and waving both Red and White and Hinomaru flags on their hands.

For *Djawa Baroe*, however, the impact may have been different from the audiovisual media. Moreover, maybe Anderson's (1993/1998) "imagined communities" is relevant here. Anderson, actually preceded by McLuhan (1964), has mentioned this in his much earlier work. He argues that print media helps to create nationalism by giving the people standardized language and, more importantly, the sense of unity and companionship. Print media, indeed, have made the readers became aware that he or she is a part of the broader community and participates in the same communion. In this perspective, *Djawa Baroe* has helped in nurturing the sense of a single community, although they do not know most of their counterparts, and that is why it is called "imagined," which in turn leads to a sense of one nation. According to Mark (2010: 348), while Indonesia's nationalists feared the Japanese, at the same time they "...naturally sought to make the most of both the Japanese, and the new media technologies, to further a longer-standing nation-building agenda". In other words, against the original intention of the Japanese propaganda, *Djawa Baroe* may have helped its educated reader to imagine their nation-state, Indonesia. In this sense, *Djawa Baroe*, as some "positive aspects of Japanese occupation" out of the misery and suffering caused by the occupation mentioned earlier, has contributed to the nation-building process of Indonesia.

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